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This articlecontributes to the discussion about the multidimension-
al consequences of the crisis and conflict in Ukraine. It focuses on 
the rarely discussed subject of the implications of the events in this 
country since 2013 for Polish-Ukrainian relations from Warsaw’s per-
spective. This article has three major goals: firstly, to present the his-
torical determinants influencing contemporary Polish-Ukrainian rela-
tions; secondly, to characterize the reaction of Poland to the events in 
Ukraine since 2013; and finally, to point out major implications of the 
crisis and conflict for bilateral relations from a Polish standpoint. The 
paper concludesthat,contrary to many domestic official statements, 
the Ukrainian crisis and conflict brought more challenges and dilem-
mas than tangible benefits for Poland. Obviously, bilateral contacts 
with Kiev are nowadays much better than a few years back, but this 
does not mean that Warsaw profits greatly from this situation. Moreo-
ver, new and rather unexpected challenges emerged in these relations, 
concerning, among others,Ukraine’s historical policy, the activities of 
right-wing extremists andthe lack of prospects of joiningthe eu and 
nato, which is a long-term Polish ambition for her neighbour. 
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The recent crisis and conflict in Ukrainehas become an object of a great 
deal of insightful scientific analyses. Some of these have focused on 
the very roots of this war, explaining the intricacies of inter-Ukrainian 
relations, most notably the visible rupture between the western and 
eastern part of this country.1 Others attempted to analyze the course2 
or the geopolitical background of events in Kiev, the Crimean Penin-
sula and Donbass, with a special emphasis placed on relations between 
the United States, Western European powers and Russia.3 In the pleth-
ora of books and papers on the Ukrainian conflict, one topic is usually 
omitted or neglected: its strictly regional dimension. It is surprising 
as the events in Ukraine since the end of 2013 have a substantial con-
nection with the dynamics of international relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe.
In this context, this paper aims to fill this gap by presenting the Eu-
romaidan revolution, the annexation of Crimea, as well as the con-
flict in Donbass from the Polish perspective. Adopting such a scientific 
approach is justified as it is the only Central European state that is a 
member of nato and the eu, which in turn played a certain role in the 
initial phases of the Ukrainian crisis. This is also the only Central Eu-
ropean actor that perceives an independent and pro-Western Ukraine 
as a long-term and fundamental goal of its foreign policy in the East. 
Thus, the study has three major goals. Firstly, it aims to present the his-
torical determinants influencing contemporary Polish-Ukrainian rela-
tions. Secondly, it will characterize the reaction of Poland to the events 
in Ukraine since 2013. And finally, it will address major implications of 
the crisis and conflict for bilateral relations from Warsaw’s viewpoint. 
Ukraine in Polish Foreign Policy: a Historical Perspective
The roots of contemporary Polish-Ukrainian relations can be traced 
back to the Middle Ages, when the Kingdom of Poland in the 14th cen-
tury started its expansion eastward, towards territories previously held 
by the Kievan Rus (“Red Ruthenia”).4 From that time, Poland for several 
hundred years focused on the subordination of wide reaching terri-
tories that belong today to contemporary Ukraine. This process was 
strongly determined by Poland’s personal, and later real, union (the 
Union of Lublin in 1569) with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which 
resulted in the incorporation of Ukraine, including the so called Wild 
Fields, to the Polish Crown. Under the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian 
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Commonwealth, former Kievan Rus territories were subjected to vari-
ous processes, such as colonization by the magnates, Tartar incursions 
from the Crimean Peninsula, the foundation of Cossacks, the crea-
tion of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and repetitive uprisings 
against Polish rule.5 They visibly contributed to the creation of the 
Ukrainian national identity, which was later built partially on histori-
cal resentments, fueled by economic and religious differences. 
Historically, Polish-Ukrainian relations were almost always influ-
enced by the ‘Russian’ factor. It is due to the fact that at the same time, 
the territories of Ukraine were a subject of long-term rivalry between 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Grand Duchy of Mos-
cow/Russia that aimed to unite all the principalities formerly under Ki-
evan Rus control.6 These tendencies manifested themselves in a series 
of wars between Russia and Poland, e.g. 1654-67. In time, due to the 
slow decline of the Commonwealth, Moscow gained the upper hand, 
which resulted in the partitioning of Poland at the end of the 18th cen-
tury, and in effect, seizure of Ukraine by Russia. From that time both 
nations were subjected to foreign domination. According to Szeptycki 
“even if Poland was not any more an independent country, the relations 
between the Polish and Ukrainian communities remained conflictual 
and asymmetrical. The already existing religious differences were dou-
bled by an economic and social conflict.”7
This specific rivalry over Ukraine between Poland and Russia re-
sumed at the beginning of the 20th century. Both Poles and Bolsheviks 
perceived Ukraine after World War I as a strategic area which should 
be seized in order to secure crucial foreign policy goals. Moscow sought 
to conquer Ukraine not only due to its economic importance. They 
also perceived control over this territory as a sine qua non requirement 
to launch a global Communist revolution. Poles, on the other hand, 
perceived this area as a pivotal ‘buffer zone,’8 which would separate the 
Second Polish Commonwealth from the imminent Bolshevik threat.9 
Moreover, many decision-makers and representatives of the political 
elite believed that, without Ukraine, Russia would cease to be a great 
power. There were generally two Polish concepts concerning relations 
with Ukraine during the interbellum. The first, promoted by the right-
wing leader Roman Dmowski, suggested that Poland should seize only 
limited territories in the east. Dmowski aimed to control areas with 
a dominant Polish national element, which would allow eventually 
for the assimilation of the rest of the inhabitants. Thus, only a small 
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part of western Ukraine, including Lviv, should be incorporated into 
the Second Commonwealth. The rest, according to Dmowski, would 
remain within the Russian empire. The second concept, pushed by 
Poland’s leader Józef Piłsudski, envisaged a broad confederation of Po-
land with nation-states in the east, these being: Lithuania, Belarus and 
Ukraine.10 Both Polish and Bolshevik concepts clearly neglected rising 
Ukrainian ambitions to gain independence.
These contrary interests clashed during the Polish-Bolshevik war 
1919-1921, in which the Ukrainian factor played a major role. Poles 
and some Ukrainian leaders (Symon Petlura) cooperated against the 
Communists during the conflict.11 However, the 1921 Riga peace trea-
ty once again divided Ukraine between Poland and Bolshevik Russia, 
which naturally disillusioned and angered its inhabitants, as well as 
the former leaders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The reinstate-
ment of Warsaw’s rule over Western Ukraine in effect raised armed 
opposition, organized mostly by the Organization of Ukrainian Na-
tionalists, which was repressed by the Polish government.12 Simulta-
neously, Ukrainians on the other side of the border were subjected to 
Communist repressions and the greatest famine in Ukraine’s history 
– Holodomor – which killed around 4 million people. Despite this fact, 
during September 1939’s German and Soviet invasion of Poland, many 
Ukrainians supported both invading armies.13 
In this context, it has to be stressed that World War ii contributed 
to the huge historical controversies between Poles and their eastern 
neighbors. It is due to the fact, that since the Third Reich’s invasion of 
the Soviet Union in 1941 many Ukrainians with nationalistic attitudes 
flirted or sided with the Nazis. This was perfectly visible in the activities 
of the oun (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and upa (Ukrain-
ian Insurgent Army).14 Despite the fact that initial Ukrainian hopes to 
obtain sovereignty with Hitler’s help proved to be trivial, many of them 
still cooperated with Germany in the form of the creation of the 14 
Waffen-Grenadier-Division der ss, composed of Ukrainian volunteers. 
This division was involved in counter-insurgency operations against 
Polish rebels, as well as responsible for war crimes against the civilian 
population.15 Much more serious crimes against Poles were committed 
by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (upa) – which was responsible for 
brutal ethnic cleansing (or, as many Polish scientists and journalists 
insist – even genocide) of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, which resulted 
in the deaths of more than 100 000 people in 1943 and 1944.16 In Polish 
88
cejiss
2/2017
historiography these tragic events are usually denominated as the ‘Vol-
hynia slaughter’ (rzeź wołyńska).
The experiences of World War ii deepened divisions among Ukrain-
ian society, which became visible in the Post-Cold War era and played 
a certain role in the eruption of conflict in 2014.17 Similarly, they also 
opened a serious wound in Polish-Ukrainian relations, as both socie-
ties blamed one another for their sufferings. On the one hand, Poles 
remembered the genocide in Volhynia, as well as the attitude of many 
Ukrainians during the invasion of September 1939 and the follow-
ing occupation of the Second Commonwealth. On the other hand, 
Ukrainians stressed their mistreatment during the interbellum period, 
the Vistulaoperation against upa/oun members and supporters (1947-
1950), as well as forcible expulsions from Poland after the war. 
 After World War ii, these resentments were largely buried by Com-
munists from both sides, as the Soviet decision makers focused on new 
challenges concerning rivalry with the West. Moreover, it has to be 
mentioned that the Polish People’s Republic, dependent on the ussr, 
obviously forgot about any ambitions concerning Ukraine. Thus, the 
proactive stance towards this state could only resurface during the 
democratic transition period of 1989-91. As the dissolution of the Sovi-
et Union approached, independent Poland adopted the so called ‘two-
way policy.’ On the one hand, new Polish decision makers officially 
declared that they aimed to maintain good relations with the Kremlin, 
which was at the time crucial due to national security reasons. On the 
other hand, the leaders of the Third Commonwealth supported move-
ments that were struggling to regain independence from the Soviet 
Union. In this context, many politicians in Warsaw assumed the tradi-
tional approach towards Ukraine, dating back to the beginnings of the 
20th century, which was however adapted to the international reality of 
the Post-Cold War era. To begin with, decision makers hoped that an 
independent Ukraine would help to dismantle the Soviet Union and 
weaken its successor – Russia. Otherwise, the Kremlin’s domination of 
Central and Eastern Europe might be reinstated. Moreover, they also 
supported the idea of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union 
and nato. This, in effect, would effectively mean that Poland would 
not have to be a border state of both organizations. And finally, the 
realization of this goal would fulfill the traditional objective –the crea-
tion of a strong ‘buffer zone’ between pro-Western Central Europe and 
the Federation of Russia.18 
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From Moscow’s standpoint, Ukraine was perceived as a part of the 
so called ‘Near Neighborhood’ zone, vital for Russian national interests. 
According to Moscow’s decision makers, control over Ukraine was cru-
cial not only for domestic reforms and influence in the Post-Soviet area 
but also for relations with the West. Paradoxically, they also perceived 
Ukraine as a specific kind of ‘buffer zone’, which in time could separate 
Russian borders from the nato zone of influence, which was still per-
ceived as a major threat to the Federation’s security.19
Thus, in the Post-Cold War era the traditional regional rivalry 
over Ukraine was, in a certain sense, resumed. It was initially proven 
by Warsaw’s decision, as the first state in the world, to recognize the 
independence of Ukraine.20 In the following years Poland remained 
interested in supporting Ukrainian sovereignty, as well as its dem-
ocratic and capitalist reforms. Both states tried to omit difficult his-
torical experiences and focus on similar interests in the international 
environment. Warsaw attempted to bind Kiev with Western organi-
sations; however, it was not ready to sacrifice its own European am-
bitions to reach this goal. This was manifested by the failure of the 
so-called ‘Kravchuk plan’, which was rejected by Poland due to fears 
that it would ruin its own integration with the nato and the eu. In 
effect, despite the fact that the atmosphere of bilateral relations was 
rather cordial, decision-makers in Warsaw failed to reach their most 
important goal concerning Kiev.21 This situation was obviously ben-
eficial for the Russians, who successfully kept an edge over relations 
with Ukraine. Taking into consideration cultural similarities, as well as 
strong political, economic and military ties between both states, it was 
relatively easy for the Kremlin to preserve its unofficial domination. 
This was especially visible during Leonid Kuchma’s presidency.22 Mos-
cow’s activities towards Kiev usually included such tools as strength-
ened political and economic cooperation, as well as the containment 
of Western presence.23 To recapitulate, in the clash between contrary 
Polish and Russian interests in Ukraine, Moscow held the upper hand.
This rather stable situation slightly shifted at the beginning of the 
21st century. Internal political crisis in Ukraine, transformed into the 
Orange Revolution in November 2004, proved to be a perfect oppor-
tunity to change the tide of the Polish-Russian rivalry over Ukraine. 
As electoral fraud during the presidential election sparked huge public 
protests, the Polish political elite sided vigorously with demonstra-
tions against pro-Russian politicians: Kuchma and Yanukovych. Many 
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of Poland’s most popular politicians travelled to Kiev in order to ex-
press their support to the democratic movement and its candidate Vic-
tor Yushchenko.24 Its eventual success proved to be a major setback 
for Moscow and a great opportunity for Warsaw, which expected to 
benefit from this change. Warsaw hoped that under Victor Yushchen-
ko’s presidency, Ukraine could be permanently drawn to the Western 
zone of influence. Therefore, Polish decision-makers attempted to en-
ter into multidimensional strategic cooperation with Kiev, which was 
manifested, for example, by their constant support of Ukraine’s candi-
dature to nato and the European Union. Warsaw and Kiev also coordi-
nated their policies during the Georgian-Russian war in 2008.25 Russia 
on the other hand, perceived the fall of Yanukovych and Kuchma as 
a major failure, as well as a threat to the Near Neighbourhood policy. 
Therefore, it attempted to change this state of affairs using, among 
others, political and economic tools. As a side effect, the Orange Revo-
lution also contributed to the deterioration of Polish-Russian relations. 
Moscow used many opportunities to manifest its negative stance to-
wards Warsaw, which was proven by, for example, the establishment of 
a national holiday commemorating the expulsion of Poles from Krem-
lin in 1612.26 
Unfortunately, the presidency of Victor Yushchenko proved to be 
not only a great disappointment for Ukrainian citizens but also for the 
Polish political elite. He did not meet their hopes for rapid pro-West-
ern transformation. Moreover, during his term, the difficult history fi-
nally resurfaced in bilateral relations, as he officially glorified upa and 
oun members. Moreover, he granted the title of the Hero of Ukraine 
to one of the most controversial leaders of upa – Stepan Bandera. Such 
a policy was negatively received in Poland, due to the aforementioned 
responsibility of upa for the genocide of Poles during World War ii.27 
Thus, from the Polish perspective, results of the strategic cooperation 
with Ukraine between 2004 and 2010 were considered a failure.28 
As a result, another political change in Ukraine in 2010, i.e. Vic-
tor Yanukovych presidential election success, was met in Poland 
with somewhat limited interest, as decision makers became weary 
of ‘strengthened cooperation’ with Kiev. Obviously, they were aware 
that he aimed to maintain close, strategic relations with Russia, which 
made all potential attempts of rapprochement futile. Hence, while the 
atmosphere of bilateral contacts was still positive, they had lost their 
former drive. Before the crisis Warsaw still supported Kiev in its asso-
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ciation process with the eu, but its level of commitment, compared to 
earlier periods, decreased. Also Poland’s domestic mass media became 
relatively less interested in Ukrainian politics. 
Poland’s Reaction to the Ukrainian Crisis  
from Caution to Limited Commitment
These trends reversed in 2013 due to the Revolution of Dignity in Kiev. 
In November, when the Euromaidan protests erupted, the political 
elite in Poland quickly realized that it was another chance to ‘pull out’ 
Ukraine from the Russian zone of influence. This time, however, the 
initial reaction of Warsaw was much more cautious than during the 
Orange Revolution. Despite the fact that again many representatives 
of political parties travelled to Kiev (e.g. Jarosław Kaczyński from the 
Law and Justice party), in order to support protesters, the government 
limited itself to overly diplomatic statements and declarations, which 
sided with the pro-Western ambitions of Ukrainian citizens.29 As the 
internal crisis deteriorated at the beginning of 2014, Poland, alongside 
Germany and France, mediated between conflicting sides in order to 
avoid further bloodshed. Its role was symbolized by the February 21st 
2014 agreement. However, as Victor Yanukovych fled the country, the 
treaty was immediately cancelled.30 As it soon became clear, this was 
the apex of Polish political engagement in the crisis. 
The following emergence of the new pro-Western government was 
naturally considered in Warsaw to be a major benefit which could end 
its long-term rivalry with Russia over Ukraine. It was due to the fact 
that its association with the European Union created mechanisms, 
which were somewhat difficult for the Kremlin to nullify with the use 
of traditional instruments of the ‘Near Neighbourhood’ policy. There-
fore, it was not a surprise that Prime Minister Donald Tusk decided 
to recognize Arsenij Yatsenyuk’s government, despite its violation of 
the February 21stagreement. This laid strong foundations for rapid 
rapprochement between both states. It must be noted that no one at 
this point in Poland expected a military reaction from Moscow or the 
upcoming civil war in Donbass. Thus when the Russian ‘green man’ 
started to seize strategic points on the Crimean Peninsula, Polish de-
cision-makers took a much firmer position than during Euromaidan, 
stressing that the territorial integrity of Ukraine must be maintained. 
Moreover, they stressed that the international community should in-
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crease pressure on the Kremlin in order to force it to withdraw.31 The 
subsequent Russian aggression on Crimea and the war in Donbass 
fundamentally changed the reception of Ukraine’s events in Poland. 
Public opinion shifted from satisfaction of the transformation in Kiev 
to rapidly rising anxiety concerning the conflict’s negative influence 
on national security. It was mostly due to the fact that relations with 
Russia quickly deteriorated, as a rising scale of political incidents be-
tween both parties occurred. For instance, in October 2014 a spy scan-
dal in Poland broke out, as the security services arrested two Poles ac-
cused of gathering intelligence for the Kremlin. This was followed by 
the decision to expel four Russian diplomats.32 Moreover, numerous 
military incidents between the Federation and nato troops, a Russian 
embargo on Polish fruit and vegetables imposed in July 2014, as well as 
unexpected military drills near the Polish border also played a certain 
role.33 
As a result, many experts, journalists and even some politicians 
contributed to the widespread fear of an immediate Russian invasion 
against Poland.34 Obviously a scenario of imminent Russian aggression 
was impossible at the time.35 Nevertheless, the Kremlin was rightly cat-
egorized as a rising military threat to Poland’s security. This was con-
firmed by the 2014 National Security Strategy, which stated: ‘In the vi-
cinity of Poland there is a risk of regional or local conflicts, which may 
involve it indirectly or directly. Poland is also not free from the forms 
of political pressure using military arguments. In its vicinity there is a 
high concentration of military capabilities, also with offensive config-
uration.’36 Between the lines, this obviously referred to the Federation 
of Russia. This situation therefore created another dilemma for Polish 
foreign policy, concerning the development of a new and efficient mo-
dus operandi in relation to a clearly hostile Kremlin.
It is unsurprising that Poland chose to visibly support Ukraine dur-
ing the conflict in Donbass, which reflected the cordial atmosphere 
of bilateral contact at the time. There are several examples to support 
this statement. To begin with, in August 2014 The Polish Ministry of 
Defence decided to send 320 tons of humanitarian aid to Ukrainian 
soldiers.37 Secondly, during the most intensive battles, domestic associ-
ations gathered equipment which could be used in support of Kiev’s ef-
forts in the east. One of them transferred eight off-road vehicles to the 
Maidan Self Defence troops.38 Thirdly, in July 2014 2000 bulletproof 
vests and 6000 helmets produced in Poland were sold to the Ukrainian 
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National Guard.39 Other military deliveries from Poland were conclud-
ed after two years, in mid-2016, with the condition that they will only 
concern non-combat equipment.40 Finally, aside from strictly materi-
al help, Warsaw launched political and economic initiatives, aimed at 
stabilizing its eastern neighbour. Among others, it supported internal 
reforms in Ukraine, promoted democracy and human rights through 
various state-sponsored grants.41 It also provided financial help, which 
was symbolized by the 100 million euro loan program, granted in Jan-
uary 2015 for 10 years.42 
Considering Ukrainian shortages during the war, the amount of Pol-
ish involvement was somewhat insignificant mostly due to the scarcity 
of Poland’s own resources. Economically and militarily, Warsaw was 
not ready to provide greater help, which would have made a differ-
ence in Donbass. It was well understood by the Ukrainians themselves, 
which were much more interested in cooperation with the United 
States and Western European countries.43 It is thus unsurprising that 
the political significance of Poland in the international debate over the 
events in the east dropped significantly in 2014 and 2015. From one 
of the key mediators in February 2014 in just a few months Warsaw’s 
role was reduced to only one of many foreign supporters of the new 
government in Kiev.
The War in Ukraine and its Implications for Poland
Careful analysis of Poland’s foreign policy goals towards Ukraine be-
fore and during the war indicates that almost none of them have been 
reached so far. Warsaw traditionally pushed for Kiev’s rapid integra-
tion with nato and the eu, which would ensure its democratic politi-
cal system, internal stability, and hence, the creation of a strong ‘buffer 
zone’ separating Central Europe from Russia. In effect, Poland would 
lose its border state status, which entails serious security and finan-
cial challenges. Moreover, Poland’s decision-makers maintained am-
bitions to play the role of Ukraine’s “advocate” in their relations with 
the West. As Andrzej Szeptycki put it: ‘Such a position stems from the 
importance of Ukraine for Poland, but also from a will to strength-
en the position of Poland in the international arena (in particular in 
the European Union). In consequence Poland considers that it should 
be consulted on the Ukrainian issues.’44 Finally, Warsaw attempted to 
minimize the negative effects of the conflict on its own national secu-
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rity. None of these aims have been met so far, despite the fact that cur-
rently the Ukrainian government can be perceived as pro-Western. In 
this context, the events in Ukraine since 2013 have created several im-
portant challenges for Warsaw concerning bilateral relations with Kiev.
To begin with, Poland was visibly sidelined in the international 
negotiations over the events in Donbass. Early in the crisis, Warsaw 
played an important role in mediations between the opposition and 
the Yanukovych government. However, immediately after the failure 
of the February 21st agreement,45 the new Ukrainian leaders ceased to 
be interested in Poland as a partner and mediator in negotiations with 
Russia, focusing mostly on the aforementioned cooperation with the 
United States and eu leaders.46 This unwillingness was quickly noticed 
with surprise by many journalists and politicians in Poland, which 
were until now convinced that the pro-Western shift in Ukraine would 
strengthen the international position and influence of Warsaw.47 This 
was confirmed by the lack of Kiev’s visible initiatives to include its 
western neighbour in the Milan (during 2014 10th Asia/Europe Sum-
mit) or Minsk talks. President Bronisław Komorowski summed up 
the unexpected Ukrainian désintéressement in 2014 with a meaningful 
statement: ‘a good advocate is one that helps when you request it, and 
not the one that forces assistance.’48 This sentence symbolically reflects 
the failure of Polish ambitions to be included in high-profile negotia-
tions on the Ukrainian conflict, which were visible in multiple state-
ments of, for example, Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz and Foreign Affairs 
Minister Grzegorz Schetyna.49 This situation may be considered a se-
rious problem for Poland, which had not only suffered a prestigious 
setback but also had lost even minimal influence on negotiations over 
issues which hold great importance for its national security. It is worth 
noticing that Kiev’s stance has not changed even after the emergence 
of a new government in Poland in 2015, despite its numerous friendly 
gestures towards Kiev.50
Secondly, it has to be stressed that, despite Polish hopes, Ukraine 
currently has barely any visible perspectives of joining the European 
Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was suggested 
several times by the top European and Euro-Atlantic leaders, for in-
stance, by the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
who stated that ‘Ukraine will definitely not be able to become a mem-
ber of the eu in the next 20 to 25 years and not of nato either.’51 This 
meant that despite Ukrainian hopes expressed during the Euromaidan 
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revolution, association with the eu was not the first step for acceler-
ated integration. This statement is not a surprise considering not only 
the Copenhagen criteria but also the fact that the eu and nato will 
never accept a member that is coping with a serious internal crisis. 
Furthermore, several Western European states are traditionally scep-
tical towards such a scenario due to the logic of relations with Russia52. 
Poland was and is, due to the aforementioned interests, a strong ad-
vocate of Ukrainian membership in both organisations; however its 
influence on European and Euro-Atlantic decision-making processes 
is too insignificant to make a real difference.
In this context, the current impossibility of Kiev’s accession may be 
considered as another setback for Polish foreign policy, as the ‘buffer 
zone’ scenario is currently in tatters. Without membership in the eu/
nato, Ukraine will remain in a geopolitical vacuum, a grey zone of 
security, located between two hostile blocks –The Federation of Russia 
and nato. Such a position is challenging not only for its own security 
and internal stability, but also for the security of its neighbours, includ-
ing Poland, exposed to negative processes appearing within Ukraine 
now and in the future. Considering such problems as the smoulder-
ing conflict in Donbass, the still high tension in relations with Russia, 
widespread corruption, activities of oligarchs, economic crisis, energy 
supply problems and the rise of organized crime, it is not a surprise 
that many Western journalists and experts debate the risk of Ukraine’s 
serious destabilization.53
The possibility of such a scenario has already been manifested by the 
subversive activities of armed formations which are not subordinate to 
the government in Kiev – i.e. the Right Sector. In July 2015 three people 
died and seven were injured in a firefight between local armed group 
and the Right Sector battalion in Mukachevo.54 As the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace Ukraine Reform Monitor: August 2015 
authors stated: ‘The armed confrontation in the town of Mukachevo 
in July 2015 between a private security group working for a Rada dep-
uty and members of the nationalist Right Sector political party cast 
a spotlight on significant internal security problems in Ukraine. The 
problems stem from a combination of organized crime, corrupt law 
enforcement agencies, illegal trafficking of goods and weapons, prolif-
eration of weapons in the country, and the increasing militarization of 
some political groups.’55 This sparked legitimate concerns that Ukrain-
ian security services are inefficient, and hence, that such phenomena 
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may endanger the security of the Polish border. Thirdly, the Donbass 
conflict may be considered to be one of the causes of the unexpected 
phenomenon of mass Ukrainian migration to Poland. The annexation 
of Crimea and the civil war caused internal displacement, estimated 
at around 1.5 million people.56 According to United Nations estimates 
in 2015, around 800 000 have fled Ukraine due to the conflict.57 It is 
unknown how many left the country due to the deteriorating econom-
ic situation and how many due to the threat of military mobilization, 
which was announced in 2015 and encountered serious problems due 
to draft dodgers.58 However, the fact is that one of the most important 
directions of the recent outflow of Ukrainians was and is Poland. This 
naturally sparks some controversies, both domestically and in the in-
ternational environment. 
The new Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło stated at the begin-
ning of 2016 that ‘Poland has accepted around a million refugees from 
Ukraine, people whom nobody wanted to help.’ This statement, used 
as an argument against the eu’s relocation system proposal, was quick-
ly criticized by Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland Andriy Deshchytsia. 
According to him, these citizens cannot be categorized as ‘refugees’ as 
they are simply ‘economic migrants.’59 Obviously the statement about 
a million refugees can be seen as an exaggeration, but it is a fact that 
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have arrived in Poland since the 
beginning of the crisis, usually as workers or students.60 The inflow 
of a huge wave of Ukrainian migrants to Poland usually sparks few 
controversies among society, mostly due to their cultural proximity.61 
However, it has to be stressed that there are two apparent challenges 
emanating from this situation. On the one hand, this is a serious prob-
lem for Poland’s integration policy which is currently non-existent. So 
far there has been little to no public debate on its coherent vision and 
plans to integrate about one million foreign workers and students in 
Poland. The lack of such may have serious social and internal securi-
ty consequences in the future, as Western European examples prove. 
On the other hand, there is the burning issue of an increasing wave of 
Ukrainian right-wing extremist incidents in Poland, including these 
of anti-Semitic and Nazi backgrounds. Some were connected to activ-
ities of the Nazi and neo-pagan organization called the Misantropic 
Division (md), related to the infamous Azov volunteer battalion, which 
possesses firearms and combat experience due to its former activities 
in Donbass.62 This sparked legitimate concerns about the possible ef-
97
Miron 
Lakomy
fects of these trends on Poland’s national security, especially taking 
into consideration that the md has even opened a Polish branch. 
Fourthly, the new Ukrainian political elite have promoted a new vi-
sion of Ukrainian history since February 2014, which is highly contro-
versial from the Polish perspective. According to Kiev, upa/oun mem-
bers, including one of their leaders and ideologists, Stepan Bandera, are 
national heroes, meritorious for the fight for Ukrainian independence. 
This approach was adapted with complete disregard of their coopera-
tion with the Third Reich, ‘ss-Galizien’ war crimes during the World 
War ii and the upa genocide in Volhynia and Galicia, which spark ob-
vious controversies in Poland. In this context it is surprising to note 
that Kiev, despite its grave geopolitical situation and lack of tested 
allies, made several provocative gestures towards Warsaw concerning 
the perception of bilateral history. One of the most debated gestures 
concerned the visit of the Polish President Bronisław Komorowski 
to the Ukrainian parliament in April 2015. The same day, this parlia-
ment decided to honor upa/oun as “combatants for freedom and the 
independence of Ukraine.”63 Many journalists, intellectuals and politi-
cians naturally considered this move to be a serious insult to Poland. 
Moreover, one can mention the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada move in 
September 2016, which criticized Polish parliament for its July 2016 
resolution on the genocide in Volhynia. Ukrainian deputies described 
the decision to commemorate this tragedy as a politicization of histo-
ry.64 Such a reaction suggests that Kiev is not ready for historical debate 
and reconciliation with Poland, as once happened between Poland and 
Germany. This is visible among the Ukrainian political elite, even if 
President Petro Poroshenko paid homage to the Volhynia massacres 
victims during his visit to Warsaw in July 2016, which in itself was an 
important gesture.65
What is even more interesting is that current Ukrainian historical 
policy has had so far relatively little influence on the course of the east-
ern policy of Poland. Despite the aforementioned controversies, which 
cooled the atmosphere of bilateral relations, the decision makers seem 
to be torn between the long-term dogma of supporting Ukraine as a 
crucial buffer zone and the need to defend historical truth about the 
Volhynia and Galicia events, recently commemorated by the Sejm af-
ter a long debate. Usually a pro-Ukrainian stance prevails, which was 
manifested symbolically by the 2015 statement of the Foreign Affairs 
Minister Grzegorz Schetyna. He stressed that the criticism of Ukraini-
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an nationalism can be perceived as support to the Russian narrative.66 
In reality, it is just the opposite. Such an approach basically hampers 
any Polish initiatives to launch a proper historical dialogue, based 
upon truth and mutual forgiveness. And without the overcoming of 
historical differences, sooner or later a political crisis in relations be-
tween Poland and Ukraine will emerge. Moreover, without full histori-
cal reconciliation between both nations, a postulated Polish-Ukrainian 
partnership will never be possible. And such a scenario is certainly in 
the interests of Vladimir Putin.
Summary
The dynamics of events in Ukraine, especially since February 2014, 
surprised the majority of the political elite in Poland, which failed to 
develop a coherent plan of action. While general foreign policy goals 
have not changed, their substantiation and realizationhas left much to 
be desired. Warsaw,which traditionally perceived Ukraine as a crucial 
partner in the eastdue to the logic of its long-term but uneven rivalry 
with Russia, has beenstrongly interested in supporting the pro-dem-
ocratic and pro-Western movement since November 2013. Its modus 
operandi was, however, rather cautious.After the outbreak of war in 
Donbass, Poland attempted to strengthen its neighbour, but the scale 
ofthesupportprovided failed to meet Kiev’s expectations and needs. At 
the same time, new Ukrainian decision makers since day one havenot 
met Warsaw’s hopes forbetter bilateral relations.Thus, the Revolution 
of Dignity, which was expected to bring great advantages, instead has 
had rather mixed outcomes for Poland. Obviously, bilateral relations 
are officially perceived as strong, dynamic and cordial. The political 
shift in Kiev allowed new kinds of cooperation, which were unattrac-
tive or impossible before. Both states have developed contacts in such 
areas as education, the military industry, hi-tech industry and science. 
Nevertheless, the current situation in relations with Ukraine can be 
barely classified as a great success forPoland’s foreign policy. The good 
atmosphere in relations with Kiev is obviously an asset which should 
be recognized and appreciated, but it does not affect several impor-
tant issues for Warsaw. Firstly, Poland was sidelined and became a pas-
sive observer of “power politics” conducted by stronger actors around 
Ukraine.Kiev is partially to be blamed for the marginalization of Poland 
in negotiations over Donbass, whichvisibly weakened its internation-
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al position in Central and Eastern Europe. Secondly, the “buffer zone” 
exists only in theory, as Ukraine has little chance of joiningthe eu or 
nato soon and its internal stability is lacking. Moreover, it has to be 
stressed, that so far there has been little debate on how to counter new 
and unconventional challenges to the security of Poland emanating 
from this crisis, i.e. the activity of right-wing extremists, which may 
be linked to the inflow of Ukrainian migrants to Poland. Finally, the 
biggest dilemma emanates from the historical policy adopted in Kiev. 
This stance, which is highly controversial from the Polish perspective, 
will have to be altered in the future if both countries seek to develop 
bilateral contacts.
In conclusion, in contrary to many domestic official statements or 
opinions in the press, the Ukrainian crisis and conflict brought more 
challenges and dilemmas than tangible benefits for bilateral relations 
from the Polish perspective. Obviously, contacts with Kiev are now-
adays much better than before, but this does not mean that Warsaw 
experiencesgreat profit from this status quo.The aforementioned chal-
lenges, if not addressed properly, in time may transform into serious 
problems, which will be beneficial only for one country – Russia.Find-
ing efficient solutions to these dilemmas requires, however, political 
will and courage, which currently seems to be lacking in both states.
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